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1 Introduction
There is now a large body of work in macroeconomics, indeed almost a consensus,
arguing that news shockscontribute a high proportion of business cycle variability.
A news shock is an event occurring today that tells people about something that
will happen tomorrow. A popular example was the totally credible announcement by
a central bank of a future monetary policy shock, such as a cut in interest rates: also
known as forward guidanceon future interest rate movements.
If the announcement is not totally credible then the event of the announcement
becomes merely a signal of a possible future cut in interest rates. Again this is
an old idea, from which the work on signal extraction developed. In this case, past
evidence on the connection between the announcement event and the future interest
rate movement is gathered to nd the best average relationship, the signal extraction
formula. From this, one can also recover the variance of the future movement condi-
tional on the event and so the chances of the predicted future movement being wrong.
In this example where credibility is less than full, the news shock is the belief about
the future movement triggered by the announcement and the error is the di¤erence
between this belief and the actual future movement.
So why are we adding yet another paper to this large literature? For two reasons
that we believe give new insight into the issue.
First, while many recognise that news shocks involve signal extraction by cur-
rent agents, we think that a key element of this signal extraction channel has been
overlooked hitherto; and that it provides a vital identifying condition.
Second, we have estimated the quantitative role of news shocks in a full DSGE
model of the US economy subject to this condition, using a method, indirect inference,
that in small samples such as we have gives low estimation bias and high test power
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against inaccuracy and misspecication. We nd that, according to these estimates,
and contrary to most previous work, that news shocks play only a small, rather trivial,
part in explaining the business cycle. In what follows we explain our approach in more
detail and relate it to the eaxisting literature.
If the future movement is ut+1, todays belief is uet+1 and the error is t+1 then
we could write down the identity ut+1 = uet+1+ t+1, which is of course an identity
because t+1 = ut+1   uet+1. We can then solve our model for the e¤ect of each
variable, uet+1 and t+1, respectively the news shock and the shock of the unpredicted
future movement when it occurs. Notice that from the signal extraction formula
based on past data together with that past data we can work out the variances of all
of ut+1; uet+1 and t+1.
In the application of modern DSGE models with many shocks, this idea of the
news shocks has been extended to many of the models shocks. Financial shocks can
be predicted from current nancial developments, such as the failure of sub-prime
mortgages. Productivity shocks can be forecast from current technological discoveries,
such as powerful battery innovation predicting the future electric car. Investment
shocks can be seen coming from current developments of robotics. The potential
cases are legion. Naturally therefore economists have paid a lot of attention in recent
papers to such news shocks. In this large literature, which we review below, various
approaches have been made to estimating uet+1 and so t+1, from macro data (the data
on the signals is generally not used and often is not available to econometricians).
Many authors mention that this is connected with signal extraction (e.g. recently
most notably Lorenzoni (2009) and the related Blanchard et al., 2013.). However, it
is important in application that the structure of restrictions between the signals and
the originating shocks is fully imposed in the estimation. Lorenzoni does not apply
the restriction we posit here, and nor does the paper he coauthors (Blanchard et al,
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2013) in which empirical results are estimated; we discuss why below. In our paper
here we show the data can be used to reveal the accuracy of the signal and hence the
news shock relative to its originating fundamental shock  through a relationship
we call the signal extraction restriction; and we show how when this is done one
can recover the e¤ect of both fundamentals and their corresponding news shocks. We
apply this to recent postwar US data and show that within a well-tting macro model
of a type widely used in recent work this restriction provides crucial identication that
resolves recent concerns about news shock models raised in recent contributions by
Sims (2017) and Chahrour and Jurado (2019).
Our point is simply this: uet+1 must be estimated subject to this signal extraction
restriction, which provides a key restriction in estimation that identies the size of
the news shock. If it is not imposed and the news shock is freely estimated on the
data, then its variance can become extremely large, even greater than that of the
future movement itself, ut+1, and it can then appear to produce very large business
cycle uctuations. For example, one could obtain very large imagined future events
in one direction which then turn out not merely to occur in the direction predicted
but actually to occur in the opposite direction. This is plainly a recipe for massive
business cycle uctuations rst in one direction, then in the other. Some authors
have found that such e¤ects can account for most of business cycle variation, totally
dominating the e¤ects that would be produced by the original shocks themselves if
not predicted at all by news shocks.
There are a variety of claims about such e¤ects in this literature. However, the
point of this paper is to show that these claims cannot be correct when the signal
extraction restriction is imposed. We go on to illustrate our point comprehensively
by estimating a widely-used macro model of the US through full systems indirect
inference estimation, and showing how one can indeed ndlarge news shocks when
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the restriction is not imposed; but that these disappear from the estimates when it
is rigorously imposed, in addition to the general rational expectations restrictions
always imposed in such estimation.
To understand why this is, one simply needs to think about two polar cases of
news shock accuracy. First, suppose that the news shock is totally accurate, like the
credible announcement of a future interest rate cut. In this case ut+1 = uet+1 and t+1
is zero. We know in this case that the future interest rate cut e¤ect is partly brought
forward in time; essentially its e¤ect is now spread across the present and the future.
Its total e¤ect on the variance of the economy is not much di¤erent from when there
is no announcement or news shock. Plainly too the variance of uet+1 must be exactly
equal to that of ut+1; it cannot be freely estimated as it is plainly the same variable.
Second, consider the case where the news signal contains no information at all (the
announcement is totally incredible). Plainly in this case ut+1 = t+1 and uet+1 = 0.
Here we are simply back with the original model with no news.
The usual case lies somewhere in between, where there is some, but not perfect,
information content in the signal. Hence there is some relationship between the future
shock and the signal, therefore also with the news shock. In this case the e¤ects of
the news shock are found by simulating a proportion of the future shock brought
forward in time, and another proportion occurring in the usual way when the future
shock actually happens. These simulated e¤ects on business cycle variation will lie
somewhere between the e¤ects of the two polar cases, that is somewhere between not
much di¤erent from the no-news case and not at all di¤erent from it.
In the rest of this paper we develop this argument formally and illustrate its conse-
quences by simulating a news shock about productivity within a well-known Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model both under the signal extraction re-
strictions when imposed on the shocks and under di¤erent assumptions when they are
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ignored. We show that even though there are in fact rather small or negligible e¤ects
on total business cyle variation from news shocks when the signal extraction restric-
tions are imposed, these e¤ects can become very large when they are not imposed.
Our conclusion is that claims that news shocks per se can introduce large business
cycle variation should be treated with scepticism.
In the following section we review recent work. In section 3 we set out the private
signal extraction framework and how it conditions our estimation process for news
shocks. In section 4 we show our own empirical work testing the news and non-news
models; our main empirical nding is that news shocks make little di¤erence to the
model, so that the models with and without news shocks are equally good at matching
the data. In Section 5, for robustness we generalise our work to cover all possible
news shocks in the model. Section 6 summarises.
2 News shocks  recent work
The idea of news about the future (news shocks) as a source of aggregate uctua-
tions goes back to Pigou (1927). Positive news about future productivity increases
the marginal product of future capital and thus encourages more investment, and
increases aggregate demand. The positive wealth e¤ect associated with news of an
increase in future productivity causes households to consume more of both goods and
leisure, thus it causes a further increase in aggregate demand and a decrease in out-
put supply. Therefore the nal e¤ect on output is ambiguous and dependent on the
magnitudes of changes in aggregate demand and supply. Business cycles can happen
in the absence of large changes in fundamentals. Cochrane (1994) revived the idea
and found that contemporaneous shocks to technology, money, credit and oil prices
could not account for the majority of observed aggregate uctuations. He showed
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that Vector Auto Regressions (VARs) estimated using articial shocks to technol-
ogy produce responses to consumption shocks that are similar to the corresponding
responses given by VARs estimated on actual US data.
Most of the literature focuses on productivity news shocks, as do we in the main,
expository, part of this paper. Much of this literature on news shocks is empirical and
makes use of Structural Vector Auto Regression (SVAR) techniques to recover the
news shocks. Beaudry and Portier (2006) nd that news shocks are the main driver
of business cycles. The largest part of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth is
anticipated by the private sector, and thus business cycles are caused by expectation
of future TFP changes. Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) also nd an important role of
news about future TFP in explaining business cycles. They conclude that recessions
are caused not by contemporaneous negative shocks but rather by dull news about
future TFP or investment-specic technical change. Barsky and Sims (2011) propose
another structural VAR approach to identify news shocks about future productivity
and nd that while news shocks are important in explaining output variation in the
medium term, they are not a major source of post-war US recessions and so are not
important drivers of business cycles.
A strand in this VAR literature has been concerned with possible non-invertibility
(aka non-fundamentalness) of the VAR  e.g. Forni et al. (2014, 2017). This
is of particular concern for VAR identication. However, the conditions for non-
invertibility are demanding and in practice not much evidence of non-invertibility has
been found in the relevant VARs (Sims, 2012; Fernandez-Villaverde et al, 2007; Le
et al, 2016c). Under our proposed identifying restriction, there must be invertibility
because future shocks can only be forecast from current news shocks; the errors
containing these can be backed out from the DSGE models equations. The DSGE
model we use thus has a standard (invertible) VAR solution, which is used in our
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indirect inference estimation and testing procedure.
Moving beyond the VAR technique, many recent papers use estimated DSGE
models with maximum likelihood or Bayesian methods to examine the importance
of news shocks in creating business cycles. The main advantage of this method over
that of the familiar VAR analysis is the ability to identify simultaneously multiple
sources of anticipated shocks and multi-period anticipated shocks. Fujiwara, Hirose
and Shintani (2011) use Bayesian methods to estimate a model of news shocks on
TFP in a New Keynesian model and nd that TFP explains around 30% of output
uctuations in the US, with the contribution of the news shocks in TFP often larger
than that of the unexpected component. In contrast Khan and Tsoukalas (2012), also
using Bayesian methods, estimate a DSGE model and nd that unanticipated shocks
dominate news shocks in explaining the variation in main macroeconomic variables
for the post-war period in the US. Schmitt-Grobe and Uribe (2012) nd that news
shocks to productivity explain a small (3%) part of the variance of the growth rates
of macroeconomic variables, while other news shocks (most notably a news shock
to the wage-markup which explains 17%) contribute a large part. Den Haan and
Kaltenbrunner (2009) show in a search-and-matching model that unemployment too
responds to news shocks, while Pavlov et al. (2013) apply them within a standard
single-agent Real Business Cycle model.
However, Gortz and Tsoukalas (2017) argue that the disagreement in the liter-
ature about the importance of TFP news shocks comes about because the DSGE
models in these studies do not incorporate a nancial sector, and so miss out the
credit channel. To remedy this, they adopt a two-sector New Keynesian model with
a nancial channel featuring leverage constraints. They nd that news about future
TFP, the majority of which is consumption-specic TFP news, explains a large frac-
tion of the business cycle. Kamber et al. (2017) use a small open economy model with
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nancial frictions and also nd that news shocks to productivity generate business
cycle co-movements in the main macroeconomic variables.
One can summarise this literature in two parts: the SVAR studies which generally
nd a large role for news shocks in explaining business cycle uctuations and the
DSGE studies whose ndings for the contribution of news shocks vary substantially.
In this paper we explain analytically, with empirical support, why news shocks should
matter little for business cycles.
3 The micro-foundations of private-signal extrac-
tion
In this section we show that rational expectations must imply a certain relationship
between news shocks and future shocks, since news shocks are a product of the signal
extraction process. We will derive this relationship and point out that it has not been
obeyed in the literature.
The usual way that the literature has modelled the news elements is
Xt = Xt 1 + "t + "
h
t h
where ut = "t+"ht h is a shock with an unanticipated element ("t) and an anticipated




which is observed h periods ago. For simplicity in
this exposition, we assume that news is just one period ahead and we consider the
next period future shock as
ut+1 = "t+1 + "
1
t (1)
When incorporating news about future shocksin to a model, we are postulating
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that there is a direct link to the future that comes from a current public shock that
is observed by agents but is not directly observed by the econometrician1. If this is
the case, then agents will observe this news and act upon it. This action will have
some e¤ects in some of the equations of the model where they will enter as observable
error terms, to be estimated by the econometrician. In the following exposition we will
assume, as our example of what is going on, that the news is about future productivity,
that it comes from current R&D spending, and that its e¤ects will show up in the
investment equation. Our analysis can be applied to any other source of news about
the future but productivity shocks are a natural candidate for pre-cognition since
their origin often lies in prior innovatory activity (in the laboratory etc). When there
is news, agents can either exactly know the future (through their R&D programmes,
RD) or know it with some random error. This comes about through signal extraction
where agents have a current noisy process from which they extract the signal they
wish to identify2: it can be assumed that agents can obtain a statistical relationship
from R&D to the latter e¤ects by observing previous R&D programmes in the rm,
and the consequences of these.
Suppose that the noisy signal, here R&D spending, consists of two elements, the
varying experimental spending that directly produces future productivity, ut+1 (with
a normalised coe¢ cient of unity), and other unrelated experimental spending, vit:
thus RDt = ut+1 + vit, illustrated in the Figure 1 below.
Therefore, we have rst a regression relationship of ut+1 on RDt by the agents
1This is not to say that they necessarily cannot be observed by econometricians. It might be
possible to gather data on such things as monetary announcements, technology developments or
nancial events. However, in the work discussed here this is not generally done. Instead the news
shocks are estimated from the macroeconomic data alone.
2These micro-foundations and how they a¤ect rational expectations models have been well-known
for some time: see for example Minford and Peel, 2002, chapter 3, for the workings of signal extraction
and see ibid, chapter 2, pp. 65-69, for how a perfectly forecast future shock is solved for in the model.
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Figure 1: Noisy Signal
carrying out signal extraction3:
ut+1 = RDt + "t+1 (2)
Given the agentsfailure to have complete future information, their rational expecta-
tion of ut+1, Etut+1, is
Etut+1 = RDt (3)
This would be what agents predict will be the outcome for ut+1 given their observation
of RDt; this will be the news shock.
However, the econometricians modelling this news shock do not observe RDt and
simply observe current and past values of the productivity shock u. But they know
3We assume these relationships are estimated by OLS because these agents do not have access
to a structural model with more than this bivariate relationship
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that a) agents creating the news shock do observe RDt and b) RDt consists of the
two elements as above, RDt = ut+1 + vit and c) these agents have an optimal signal
extraction regression as above from which they derive Etut+1.
These econometricians can argue as follows.
They know that agents using the signal-extraction regression will have found a
coe¢ cient of ut+1 on RDt of  =
cov(RD;u)
var(RD)
: They know also that the relationship in





and the regression error
is wt so that RDt = 
var(RD)
var(u)
ut+1 + wt. This equation could be estimated by agents
who knew the R&D data; but of course it is of no use to them so they will not bother
with it. Nevertheless it exists in the data.
It follows that the econometricians know that there is a relationship between the
news shock and future productivity of the form "1t = ut+1+t. This is because the two
regression relationships between productivity and R&D, yield a relationship between
what agents expect and the future productivity that will occur. The econometricians
do not know either of these relationships individually since they do not have access to
the R&D data but they do know how they are derived. From this they can derive the
relationship they need between the news shock and future productivity, as follows:
"1t = Etut+1 = RDt = 
2var(RD)
var(u)





and t = wt
This tells us that the news shock, like R&D, is partly connected to future produc-






is simply the correlation coe¢ cient between R&D and future produc-
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tivity. In what follows we will refer to  for simplicity as the signal extraction
parameter, since it is the parameter derived from the signal extraction process that
we can estimate from our models, as we will see in practice below.
Of course our econometricians cannot directly estimate either  or  from data on
u or RD which they do not have. However, they can work out the size of the variances
of these two elements, conditional on . Thus, assuming they know something about
the usefulness of the R&D signal, as measured by , they can apply this to working
out the variances they must assume for the unknown stochastic variables, "1t and t
that are both key elements in the model dynamics. They can use this to estimate 
indirectly, by indirect inference, as we will explain below.





unexplained variance of RD, var(w), is






and hence the variance of the unexplained part of "1t ; ; is





= (1  )var(u) (5)
It follows that the variance of the news shock, "1t ;
var("1t ) = 
2var(u) + (1  )var(u) = var(u) (6)
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This is saying that when  = 0 the news shock has no variance because there is no
news; when  = 1 the news shock is simply equal to ut+1 and it has no additional
variance due to . Under rational expectations this restriction on the variance of
the news shock "1t needs to be enforced. In general where  lies between 0 and 1,
"1t = ut+1 + t; the news shock, has the part ut+1 that is related systematically to
the future event and the part that is unrelated to it, t, which is a random draw. The
point of this derivation is that the distribution from which this is a random draw, ; is
tightly circumscribed, with its variance related to the variance of the future shock and
the signal extraction parameter, . It is this restriction that has not been respected
in this news shock branch of rational expectations modelling.
This is in contrast to Lorenzoni (2009) who sets out a general approach to signal
extraction and imperfect information in which agents on islands speculate about what
others forecast. In this model there is no closed form expectations solution because
of a many-level expectations structure as in Keynesbeauty contest. In our approach
the information structure is simpler. Agents perceive past outcomes as well as past
signals, and react, creating publicly observable errors in economic behaviour. All
have access to this public information. Under the rational expectations hypothesis
they assume all others, with the same access, form the same expectations as they do,
so cutting out multi-level expectations issues, as is standard in rational expectations
modelstreatment of public information. It is this combination of rational expecta-
tions, public information and signal extraction that supplies us with the identifying
restriction we use. Since Blanchard, LHuillier and Lorenzoni (2013) do not use this
restriction in their ML and Bayesian estimation methods, their results allow noise er-
rors to be estimated free of it; as we show below, such estimation creates potentially
very high noise in news shocks.
We now go on in the next section to explore how this restriction should be applied
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to a DSGE macro model of the US widely used to evaluate news shocks and we
contrast our ndings with others who have not applied it.
4 Testing rational expectations models with and
without news shocks
The model we use in this section is a particular model of the US economy that we have
found to be empirically satisfactory  Le et al. (2016a). The model is a modied
version of the familiar Smets and Wouters (2007) model of the US to which we have
added exible goods and labour sectors, a nancial sector following Bernanke et al.
(1999) and a money market where money is a cheap form of collateral and thus allows
monetary policy still to be e¤ective under the zero lower bound situation. The model
was tested and estimated by indirect inference with nonstationary data and it has
a nonstationary productivity shock. The full model listing is in Appendix 1. To
incorporate productivity news shocks into the model, we assume that in the current
period agents know the productivity shocks that will hit the economy in the next
8 quarters and then after that the normal non-stationary productivity process kicks
in. Note that in terms of our analysis above this initially assumes that agents have
perfect knowledge of future shocks, so that  = 1; we go on to discuss how the
results change when we introduce imperfect signal extraction with  < 1: We use
the Indirect Inference technique on this model to address the question of whether the
productivity news shock contributes much to business cycles. In Section 5 we extend
our treatment to further news shocks and show that our conclusion that news shocks
do not contribute materially to business cycle variation is not conned to productivity.
First, we will take the model with its estimated parameters as in Le et al. (2016a)
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and add the expected productivity shocks to it. We run the indirect inference test of
this model (Le et al, 2016b) with expected shocks and nd that the model still ts the
data with the transformed Wald statistics of 1:32664. Without further reestimation
we nd that there are some di¤erences in the models behaviour as shown in Figure
2 for some bootstrap samples of output, investment and consumption (the blue lines
are withough news). This means that when they know the future productivity shocks
agents investment and spending behave di¤erently from when they do not know
the future. However, these di¤erences are small, as is clear from the illustrative
graphs and they do not increase signicantly the contribution of productivity shocks
in explaining the output variation (see Table 1).






















































































Figure 2: Comparison of Simulations with and without News
4A value less than 1.645 shows the model is not rejected.
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Variance decomposition Model as estimated with and without news shocks
Shocks Output no news Output with news  = 1
Govt Spending 5:73 5:72
Consumer Preference 3:69 3:68
Investment 3:30 3:29
to Interest rate 4:05 4:04
Productivity 14:52 14:76
Price Mark-up 0:64 0:64
Wage Mark-up 0:01 0:01
Labour supply 19:63 19:58
to Premium 36:55 36:45
to Networth 11:66 11:63
Money supply 0:20 0:20
Total 100 100
Table 1: Variation Decomposition for output explained by di¤erent shocks, using the
coe¢ cients of the estimated model without news shock
We will assess the marginal contribution of news shocks to the variances of en-
dogenous variables by simulating the shocks to exogenous variables under a full range
of assumptions about , which summarises how well agents can forecast the future
fundamental shocks; these assumptions will identify how the shocks are divided into
pure news(or noise) and forecast fundamentals concerns of Sims (2016) and
Chahrour and Jurado (2018). Our method deals with Simsconcern that the con-
tribution of pure news may be mis-measured, because we can precisely identify its
contribution. Chahrour and Jurado show that in the typical model estimation set-up
there is no way to identify the role of noise; however, it is precisely such identication
that our suggested explicit incorporation of the signal extraction process brings to
bear on the set-up.
The identifying element is , the signal extraction parameter, which we will esti-
mate. Our default news shock modelassumes  = 1; the case of perfect foresight.
To begin with, we discuss the results for variances and model data-match when this
set-up is substituted for the standard no newsmodel. After this, we will discuss
results when foresight is imperfect so that there is noise/pure news, including the case
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for the estimated .
If we allow for reestimation of the model with news shocks, we nd that the new
set of parameters (Table 2) is hardly any di¤erent. Since Indirect Inference is a
simulations based estimation technique if the parameters have hardly changed this
shows that news isnt having much e¤ect of the simulations.
This study with a DSGE model shows that news about the future productivity
shock makes only a small contribution to explaining the business cycle. This is
true whether we reestimate the model or not. While we have restricted our analysis
to productivity shocks, exactly the same arguments apply to other shocks; besides,
productivity shocks are the most likely candidate for fore-knowledge because there
is a genuine source of prior information about them from the innovatory work that
precedes them. But as noted we show that the same applies when other news shocks
found to be important by others, such as a nancial and a wage mark-up news shock,
are included in the model.
4.1 Why do news shocks have such small e¤ects in the perfect
foresight model?
In this section we aim to explain the reason of why the e¤ects of the productivity
news shock is so trivial. Imagine a world in which future productivity shocks are
regularly known today; compare this with a world in which only todays productivity
shocks are known. In the rst, each current period people are newly told a moving
average of shocks for today and a number of future periods; in the second they are
just told of todays shock. If the productivity process is a homoscedastic I(1) or I(0)
process, the two series will not look too di¤erent  which is what we nd. Thus










Elasticity of consumption c 1:737 1:650
External habit formation  0:700 0:667
Probability of not changing
wages
w 0:576 0:548
Elasticity of labour supply L 3:213 3:059
Probability of not changing
prices
p 0:938 0:895
Wage indexation w 0:426 0:405
Price indexation p 0:158 0:166
Elasticity of capital utilisation  0:107 0:112











to change in output
ry 0:025 0:027
Share of capital in production  0:185 0:176
Proportion of sticky wages !w 0:532 0:557
Proportion of sticky prices !r 0:101 0:096
Elasticity of the premium
with respect to leverage
 0:034 0:032




Money response to credit growth  1 0:046 0:044
Transformed Wald (Y; ;R) 0:0239 0:1142
A value less than 1.645 shows the model is not rejected.
Table 2: Coe¢ cient Estimates (1984Q1-2011Q4)
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di¤erently.
Consider the following simple case. Let productivity, t; be a random walk:
t = t 1+t: In the simple case where people only observe the current shock, the ex-
pectations of productivity for t+ i that drive stock markets will be Ett+i = t 1+ t
(i = 1; 2; ::::)
Now consider the case where we will assume people observe the next period shock,
t+1; in this period. Now
Etet+i = t 1 + t + t+1(i = 1; 2; :::)
Hence Etet+i = Ett+i+ t+1. The two series only di¤er by the future innovation.
The innovations in each series are: Ett+i Et 1t+i 1 = t and Etet+i Et 1et+i 1 =
t+1: Thus the Ett+i series, assuming a zero initial value for  1, runs from period
0: 0; 0 + 1; 0 + 1 + 2; ::: while the Etet+i series runs: 0 + 1; 0 + 1 + 2; ::: One
series is simply the lagged value of the other. That is, when one has news shocks one
reacts earlier to events; however the reaction is not much di¤erent. Close inspection
of the red (with news) and blue (without news) lines in the graphs of di¤erent output
simulations reveals exactly this type of pattern. The red line moves before the blue
line. However the random movements are not essentially di¤erent.
Another way of putting the matter is this. Suppose we simulate a model repeatedly
with a unit root time-series error, wt; whose innovation variance is V but has a
randomly chosen initial value of w0. Then we simulate it again repeatedly with the
same error process, with the same variance, but with a di¤erent randomly chosen
initial value, fw0. We will observe some small di¤erences in behaviour because of the
di¤erence in random initial value but they are likely to be small. This is what we see
in this paper.
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In this paper the news shock (illustrated for one period ahead) is "1t = ut+1 + t,
where in general var() = (1   )var(u): We have set  = 1 which implies that
the variance of  is zero. The other authors of DSGE models reviewed here all set
 = 1 as we do but they additionally include t with a nite variance, which they
allow to be estimated. However, this violates rational expectations as we have shown
above. If these authors wish there to be an error in expecting future TFP then they
should insert a  that is less than one and an accompanying error whose variance
is circumscribed as above. E¤ectively, what they have done is like adding a sunspot
to the model solution. If this is the case then it would mean more variation in
this random term  would lead to it having more e¤ect in explaining the variation
of macroeconomic variables. We conduct some experiments where  takes di¤erent
variances. This reects the di¤erent results found for the importance of news shocks,
as reported in the literature. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012) report the mean of the
posterior distributions standard deviation for the surprise TFP shocks at 0:63, and
much smaller standard deviations of  at four (0:17) and eight (0:21) periods ahead.
Gortz and Tsoukalas (2017) use the mean posterior distributions standard deviation
for the consumption sector TFP shocks of 0:172, together with that of  at 0:1174
and 0:2014 respectively for the four and eight periods ahead. Di¤erences in the size
of news shocks led to di¤erent conclusions about the role of the news in explaining
the variablesmovements. In our model, the standard deviation of the TFP shocks
is 0:44.
Table 3 shows how the variance attributable to TFP shocks changes as one adds
in the extra  shock. In the 1st column we show the decomposition when people
have no knowledge at all of the future TFP shock ( = 0). The 2nd column shows
the situation when people have exact knowledge of the future shock, the default case
where  = 1. The 3rd column shows the case when there is signal extraction and
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know half the shock ( = 0:5) plus the implied random . As one can see these three
columns di¤er only in minor ways.
Then in the following columns we keep the same signal extraction formula ( =
0:5) but add a random  with unrestricted and progressively higher variance. In these
we see clearly how the decomposition changes, with a steadily rising contribution of

























+ random error 
(stdev =1.0)
 = 0:5
Interest rate 43:90 44:55 17:40 27:17 29:84 35:35
Investment 5:17 5:27 4:44 16:81 20:15 25:63
Tobins q 32:26 31:83 18:35 30:34 32:13 34:05
Capital 6:35 6:35 3:83 17:53 21:75 29:41
Ination 45:62 45:38 16:62 30:84 34:57 40:84
Wage 26:36 26:64 13:63 42:03 49:72 60:64
Consumption 24:21 24:68 17:26 59:24 68:32 78:57
Output 14:52 14:76 11:49 40:77 49:35 61:31
Hours 23:30 23:06 9:91 30:82 37:80 48:64
Return on Capital 17:91 18:08 9:92 33:52 41:53 53:33
Premium 1:53 1:59 0:98 4:65 5:32 6:13
Networth 7:43 7:48 3:80 11:38 13:50 16:26
Table 3: Contribution of productivity shocks
What this table reveals is that the importance of the productivity news shock
critically depends on the addition of a free random error which violates rational
expectations. Under rational expectations restrictions news shocks appear, according
to our work here, to have merely trivial e¤ects. This can be seen clearly for output for
example, shown in bold, by comparing columns 2 and 3 with column 1 which is the
case with no news at all. Column 2 shows the case where future productivity growth
is fully known at t; here the variance of output is trivially higher. Column 3 shows
where the news shock is half correct; in this case the variance is slightly lower than
the no-news case. Now consider columns 4 to 6. Here the variance of the news shock
has been steadily boosted, it is assumed by estimation disregarding the restrictions
from signal extraction: the variances progressively rise by potentially large amounts.
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Similar patterns are observed for other variables.
Alternatively, this idea can be shown by looking at the Figure 3, where we show
on the left the various output IRFs for a future (t + 1) TFP shock which is a) not
forecast at all; the bottom line b) perfectly forecast at time t; second from bottom. c)
signal extraction (  0:5) with the variance of  restricted by rational expectations,
the shock size is 0:36: the top line,with diamonds.
Notice that the addition of news, with perfect foresight, brings the e¤ect fowards
in time, leaving the long-run e¤ect the same. Adding imperfect foresight with some
signal extraction, slightly o¤sets this bringing forward but compensates later by an
o¤setting realisation of the truth.
On the right hand side the other lines show the IRFs for three cases of higher 
shock variances. As the shock variance increases the e¤ect is brought forward in time
as well as increasing the long-run e¤ect.
Plainly therefore, allowing the  shock variance to be determined without restric-
tion allows small sample estimation to insert variances that may cause large volatility
in the model. This extra degree of freedom in estimation is prevented by the rational
expectations restriction however.
What we have done here therefore is to attempt to replicate, using a widely-used
DSGE model of the US estimated to t US data, the various ndings about the role
of news shocks in the DSGE model news literature, where a variety of DSGE models
are used but all of which are estimated on US data and therefore reect the same
general US macro facts. Our point is simply this: given that all authors implicitly
assume that signal extraction is occurring, there is a restriction on the variance of the
error agents can make in estimating the future. If this restriction is imposed, then the
role of news shocks in contributing to macro variance is rather small. However, if it is
not imposed and the errors are freely estimated, then the role can become extremely
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No News ( φ=0)
Perfect Foresight ( φ=1)
Signal Extraction ( φ=0.5)








Sig Ext + Random Error ( φ=0.5, σ=0.5)
Sig Ext + Random Error ( φ=0.5, σ=0.7)
Sig Ext + Random Error ( φ=0.5, σ=1.0)
Figure 3: Outputs IRFs for di¤erent shock assumptions
large. This nevertheless is invalid.
Lastly, we can exploit our restriction on the variance of the noiserelative to the
variance of the fundamental to estimate the signal extraction parameter, . E¤ec-
tively, then, our restriction enables identication of noise and fundamental, whereas
without it we are in the situation described by Chahrour and Jurado (2018) that a
news model with perfect foresight is observationally equivalent to one with pure noise.
In Figure 4 we show the Transformed Wald for di¤erent values of . The minimum
value occurs when  = 0:32, therefore this is the estimate of  for the productivity
shock in the model being used here.
For good measure we carry out a test of identication on the  parameter, using
the method in Le et al. (2017). The idea is that if the coe¢ cient is identied
then, when we use a large sample, as we move away from the true value of that
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Figure 4: Transformed Wald Statistic for di¤erent values of 
coe¢ cient the model will be rejected at a higher requency than 5%, the test size.
We perform the following Monte Carlo experiment. We treat the model with perfect
foresight ( = 1), our default news model, as the truemodel. We generate a large
number of simulations with a large sample size from this model (3000 simulations
with 500 observations) and use our Indirect Inference procedure to calculate a Wald
statistic, using a large VAR as the auxiliary model, for each simulation. This gives
a distribution of Wald statistics from the true. We then alter  to give us a false
model and generate a similarly large number of simulations. On each of these false
simulations we calculate the Wald statistic and see how many of them are rejected by
the true model. If  is not identied then as we move  away from the truevalue
we should continue to reject 5% of the falsesimulations at the 95% condence level,
implying that the test cannot distinguish the false reduced form from the true one,
so that more than one structural model yields the same reduced form. However, if
 is identied then as we move away from the truevalue then more of the false
simulations should be rejected. The results of this identication test are shown in
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Table 4. We nd that, indeed,  is identied as the rejection rate increases as we
move away from the truemodel. From this we can conclude that the value of  can
be estimated and should not be set arbitrarily.
Values of 
0.1 0.2 0.6 0.8
(True)
1.0
Rejection Rate 25.7% 22.2% 11.3% 8.60% 5.00%
Table 4: Identication of  parameter
5 Robustness Check
It may be argued that our analysis so far is quite restrictive, since we have only
included news shocks to TFP. As a robustness check we included news in all the
shocks of the model and recalculated the variance decomposition. In Tables 5 and 6
we report the full variance decomposition for all variables for the model without news,
and with all news shocks respectively. We nd that, again, the di¤erence between
the two are small for all variables. We also report the total variance, which again
shows very little di¤erence when including news shocks. From this we conclude that
our ndings in the previous section when just including news in TFP follow through
to the more general case.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we examine the evidence concerning the role of news shocks. By this
we mean that agents observe some data that is not observed by the econometrician
and this allows them to forecast future (publicly known) shocks by using the past


















Government Spending 0:96 0:04 0:15 0:02 0:76 3:50 0:25 5:73 4:60 3:06 0:04 0:06
Consumer Preference 0:34 0:01 0:03 0:00 0:29 4:33 6:47 3:69 1:96 3:01 0:01 0:02
Investment 1:11 4:16 1:30 6:09 0:89 2:81 3:53 3:30 2:25 3:42 0:97 0:99
Taylor Rule 4:26 0:40 2:17 0:33 1:66 4:26 3:59 4:05 2:32 3:21 0:16 0:70
Productivity 43:90 5:17 32:26 6:35 45:62 26:36 24:21 14:52 23:30 17:91 1:53 7:43
Price Mark-up 2:21 0:06 0:46 0:04 8:38 0:77 0:56 0:64 0:35 0:55 0:05 0:17
Wage Mark-up 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:14 0:00 0:01 0:01 0:06 0:00 0:00
Labour 6:56 6:29 11:22 6:69 4:70 22:52 34:66 19:63 28:96 11:61 0:49 1:83
Premium 32:05 63:14 33:60 62:89 30:47 27:89 22:71 36:55 26:59 43:36 52:64 20:30
Networth 8:59 20:59 14:86 17:06 7:22 7:29 4:01 11:66 9:53 13:71 34:83 58:86
M0 0:02 0:14 3:95 0:53 0:01 0:12 0:01 0:20 0:14 0:12 9:28 9:63
Total Variance 1:30 434:46 75:84 45:35 0:33 51:87 6:33 15:05 4:56 1:24 1:16 880:49

















Government Spending 0:91 0:05 0:16 0:03 0:72 3:39 0:26 5:36 4:44 2:92 0:04 0:06
Consumer Preference 0:31 0:01 0:03 0:00 0:26 4:04 6:17 3:37 1:86 2:79 0:01 0:02
Investment 1:06 4:18 1:28 5:83 0:85 2:84 3:64 3:25 2:29 3:23 0:94 1:00
Taylor Rule 3:94 0:40 2:14 0:33 1:57 4:25 3:61 3:95 2:36 3:23 0:16 0:72
Productivity 44:88 5:28 33:51 5:97 46:04 24:89 23:61 13:51 20:94 16:84 1:77 8:56
Price Mark-up 2:05 0:06 0:46 0:04 7:65 0:75 0:55 0:62 0:35 0:54 0:05 0:17
Wage Mark-up 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:14 0:00 0:01 0:01 0:06 0:00 0:00
Labour 6:41 6:18 11:48 6:38 4:70 21:13 34:05 19:20 28:74 11:29 0:52 2:08
Premium 32:19 63:46 33:55 63:97 31:12 30:73 24:24 38:64 28:88 45:09 53:87 20:83
Networth 8:23 20:29 14:42 16:98 7:09 7:77 3:85 11:93 10:02 13:89 34:43 58:65
M0 0:02 0:11 2:99 0:48 0:01 0:09 0:01 0:15 0:11 0:13 8:21 7:90
Total Variance 1:34 436:83 73:62 43:57 0:34 51:02 6:15 15:20 4:44 1:23 1:04 787:80
Table 6: Variance Decomposition without News
optimal signal extraction procedure. By contrast, econometricians estimate the news
shock by relating it both to current events and to future fundamental shocks.
Work based on DSGE models has also found only limited e¤ects of news shocks,
by contrast with work based on SVARs. DSGE modellers have interpreted this as
suggesting that the SVAR identication of news shocks could be at fault. However,
there are examples of DSGE models where news shocks have a large e¤ect  two
prominent examples are Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012) and Gortz and Tsoukalas
(2017), both of which use various estimated DSGE models of the same US data.
We investigated how this nding could have occurred by simulating a version
of Smets and Wouters (2007) widely-used DSGE model of the US from Le et al.
(2016a), which passed stringent indirect inference tests, and added news shocks to it.
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We found that the model with news shocks still passed the tests but was hardly altered
by the addition, and that the e¤ects of the news shocks within it were trivial when
we imposed on them the restriction from the signal extraction procedure limiting the
variance of mistakes in predicting future shocks, so-called false news. It turns out
that if the variance of false news is allowed, via free estimation, to be larger than
permitted by this restriction, then indeed the role of news shocks in contributing to
macro variance can become very large.
Within our model any news shocks that are correctly anticipated do not alter
in any essential way the stochastic structure of the model, merely advancing the
date at which the same innovations are registered by agents. However it would seem
that some DSGE authors have added to that part of the news shock that is correctly
anticipated a random error term representing false news, which depending how large
its variance is estimated to be can have potentially large e¤ects. We show in this
paper that adding this error without the correct restriction on its variance violates
the restrictions imposed by signal extraction under rational expectations; once this
restriction is imposed the role of news shocks e¤ectively disappears.
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rt = rt 1 + (1  ) (rpt + ryyt) + ry (yt   yt 1) + ert for rt > 0:0625 (16)
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Entrepreneurial consumption
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8 Appendix 2: Bootstrap samples of macro vari-
ables with and without news shocks
Figure 5: Di¤erent samples of output simulation (blue=no news, red=news)
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Figure 6: Di¤erent samples of investment simulations (blue=no news, red=news)
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Figure 7: Di¤erent samples of consumption simulation (blue=no news, red=news)
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